for the proposition that inequality, a determinant of group cohesion, undermines the ability of groups to cooperate. We analyze data from that same experiment here, but now incorporate information from surveys completed by the experimental subjects.
Below, we demonstrate that the most frequently employed measures of social capital are significant determinants of contribution levels in a canonical public goods experiment. This finding, together with our earlier work on inequality and group cohesion in public goods games (Anderson, Mellor and Milyo 2003) , provides novel support for the contention that social capital influences well-being through its effect on public goods provision (Robert Putnam 2000) .
I. Methods
The public goods experiment used in this study is a variation of the game first introduced by Marwell and Ames (1979) . Each individual in a group of N members is given a number of tokens to divide between a private account and a group account (i.e. the public good). The private account earns a return of P per token to the individual. The sum of all contributions made to the group account, denoted G, is multiplied by some amount M and shared equally by all members of the group. Hence, each group member earns (M/N)*G from the group account. In the standard design of this game, the return to the group account is a linear function of the total number of tokens in that account. If P > M/N, it is individually optimal to put all tokens in the private account. Additionally, if P < (M/N)*G, it is socially optimal for all subjects to put all tokens in the public account, making this a prisoner's dilemma game. We adopt this standard linear framework, with P=1, M=2 and N=8, so that the return for allocating one token to the public account is $0.25 (versus $1 for the private account). We also vary the fixed payments to subjects for the purpose of our analysis of the effects of inequality on group cohesion.
A total of 48 students were recruited from undergraduate classes at the College of William and Mary to participate in 6 sessions of the experiment. Each session consisted of 30 decision-making periods divided into three blocks of ten rounds; the blocks differed only in the "fixed payment" distribution (equal or unequal). Additional details on the experimental design, including the instructions given to subjects are described in Anderson et al. After the experiment, we administered a survey with 42 questions covering demographic characteristics, political attitudes and three sets of social capital measures.
2 The first set is composed of attitudinal trust measures of the sort used in the GSS; subjects are asked if they agree that "most people can be trusted," "most people try to be fair," "most people try to be helpful," "you can't trust strangers anymore," and "I am trustworthy." The second set is Tables 1 and 2 .
In order to measure the association between social capital measures and group account contributions holding all else equal, we use data from the experiment and survey to conduct multivariate analysis. This also allows us to test whether the effects of group inequality we previously observed are explained by differences in individual social capital attributes within groups. We let contributions in each round of the experiment be a linear function of indicators for round, reset effects at the start of each block, fixed payment amount, inequality treatment, and the order of such treatments across blocks. We then estimate the marginal effect of social capital by introducing one social capital measure at a time to this base specification.
Because individual contributions to the group account are bound between 0 and 10, we estimate these models using a two-limit Tobit with random subject effects. We report the means and marginal effects of each social capital measure, where the marginal effect is calculated as the tobit coefficient multiplied by the probability that the dependent variable is uncensored.
II. Results
The mean contribution for all rounds of the experiment was 2.75 tokens, with a standard deviation of 2.85 tokens. Contributions declined over the ten rounds within each block, and also declined across blocks (albeit with a positive reset effect). Controlling for these factors, we find a strong depressing effect on contributions from inequality in the fixed payments given to subjects (Anderson, Mellor and Milyo 2003) . These patterns are robust to the inclusion of controls for subject demographics, political ideology and social capital. We now make a closer examination of the relationship between individual social capital measures and contributions to the public good in this experiment.
The results for the trust measures of social capital are shown in Table 1 . All of the attitudinal measures of trust are statistically significant, although the "helpful" and "trustworthy" measures are negatively associated with contributions (the latter result is also reported by Glaeser, et al.) . Trust in strangers has the largest marginal effect (equivalent to two-thirds of the mean contribution), while the most common attitudinal measure of trust ("most people can be trusted") has a more modest impact (equivalent to just under 30% of the mean contribution).
Despite these mixed results, the key finding here is that the most frequently employed measure of trust is significantly related to contributions, which should alleviate the serious concerns about this measure raised by Glaeser, et al. and others.
The behavioral trust measures in Table 1 are also all significant (or marginally so);
Glaeser, et al. argue that such measures are more meaningful and reliable than those derived from vague attitudinal questions about trust. However, in contrast to Glaeser, et al., we find that subjects who report loaning money to friends or leaving doors unlocked contribute significantly less to the public good. Therefore, while some measures of trusting behavior are strongly and positively associated with contributions, the same is also true for attitudinal measures.
Consequently, we find no reason to prefer behavioral measures to the more common attitudinal measures of trust.
In Table 2 Marginal effects are calculated as the Tobit coefficient of the explanatory variable multiplied by the probability that the dependent variable is uncensored (evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables); separate models are estimated for each trust measure. Marginal effects are calculated as the Tobit coefficient of the explanatory variable multiplied by the probability that the dependent variable is uncensored (evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables); separate models are estimated for each trust measure.
